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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
RYAN D. NELSON, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
CaseNo.20010753-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
L THE RECORD IS CLEAR THAT NELSON WAS DENIED 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
A. Trial Counsel Was Ineffective for Failing to Call Two Critical Alibi Witnesses 
The State first claims that Nelson was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure 
to file a notice of alibi witness since the alibi witnesses that would have testified in 
Nelson's behalf "could not account for defendant's whereabouts on the Afternoon August 
3, 2001 - the day and time the crime was alleged to have occurred" (Br. of App. at 7, 9-
10). Nelson asserts that the record in this case is straightforward and clear - alibi 
witnesses were ready and willing to testify on Nelson's behalf, but trial counsel failed to 
file a notice of alibi. But for this failure, a more favorable outcome was likely. 
The State's first claim, that the alleged incident occurred on August 3, 2000, is 
incorrect. Although the State misleadingly states in its Statement Of The Case that the 
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Information alleges that the incident occurred "on August 3 or 4, 2000" (Br. of App. at 
2), the Information clearly states that the alleged crime occurred "on or about August 04, 
2000" (R. 1). And though it appears that the State claims that the victim testified that the 
alleged incident occurred on August 3, 2000 (Br. of App. at 5, citing R. 164 at 79), the 
victim was not sure what date the alleged incident occurred (R. 164 at 85, 96). The 
record is clear that the State believed the incident occurred on August 4, 2000: the 
prosecutor told the jury during opening statements that the alleged incident occurred "on 
or about August 4 of the year 2000" (R. 164 at 66); the prosecutor then explained to the 
jury during closing argument that it did not matter whether it occurred on the 3rd, 4th, or 
5th since "we don't have to establish the necessary day" considering the "on or about" 
instruction (R. 164 at 161, 173); and the jury instruction alleged the incident occurred "on 
or about August 4, 2000" (R. 111). 
Moreover, at the evidentiary hearing pursuant to Rule 23B, the trial court found 
specifically that the "testimony of both Steven Bagley and Chelsee Nelson was relevant 
to the issues presented at trial and to the defense presented by the defendant" (R. 216). 
Both were willing and able to provide alibi testimony on Nelson's behalf (R. 216). 
Thus, the State's claim that the assault could have only occurred on August 3, 
2000, is not supported by the record. The record shows that after the jury heard all 
testimony, even the prosecutor was not sure what day the alleged event supposedly 
happened (R. 164 at 161, 173). More importantly, the trial court on remand found that 
the alibi testimony was "relevant" and that trial counsel failed to take the necessary steps 
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to comply with Utah Code Annotated § 77-14-2 so that these witnesses could testify in 
Nelson's behalf (R. 111). 
Because the record clearly shows that the assault occurred on or about August 4, 
2000, Nelson's trial counsel's performance was deficient for failing to ensure that 
Stephen Bagley and Chelsee Nelson were able to testify in Nelson's behalf even though 
both were present at the trial, ready and willing to testify. But for this deficient 
performance, the outcome would have been different. 
B. Nelson's Trial Counsel Was Ineffective for Failing to Object to Hearsay 
Testimony, 
The State next claims that trial counsel's performance was not deficient for failing 
to object to hearsay testimony because "a hearsay objection would have been improper 
because none of Ms. Allred's testimony was hearsay" (Br. of App. at 12-13). Nelson 
asserts that his trial counsel failed to object to hearsay statements made by Ranae Allred 
and Officer Sorensen (Br. of Aplt. at 33). The State cites to State v. Speer, 718 P.2d 383 
(Utah 1986), to support its claim. However, Speer is not analogous to this case. 
In Speer, the child victim testified against the defendant. 718 P.2d at 384. During 
cross-examination, the defense attempted to undermine the child's credibility by 
"bringing out inconsistencies between her in-court testimony and her testimony at the 
preliminary hearing." Id. The child admitted on the stand that "at the preliminary 
hearing, she had said that she made up part of the story" regarding the sexual abuse 
3 
crime. Id. The child testified that she could not remember what part of the story was 
made up, but that the story she told in-court was true. Id. 
Over defense counsel's objection, the trial court permitted the victim's mother and 
two officers who investigated the matter testify as to what the child told them, and the 
trial court informed the jury that this testimony was "admitted for the sole purpose of 
rehabilitating the victim's credibility." Speer, 718 P.2d at 385. The Utah Supreme Court 
upheld the trial court's ruling, because the "statements admitted in this case to establish 
that the child had told a story prior to the preliminary hearing consistent with her 
testimony at trial were clearly not hearsay under Rule 801 and were properly admitted." 
Id. 
As opposed to Speer, where the child admitted on the stand that she had 
previously lied about part of her story implicating the defendant, Allred never testified 
that he lied nor was any of his testimony effectively contradicted during cross-
examination; therefore, there was no need for rehabilitative testimony. The trial court 
allowed the additional testimony in Speer because it appeared that the child had made 
part of her story up and she was unsure which part of the story was true or false. See 
Speer, 718 P.2d at 384-85. The trial court admitted prior statements for the sole purpose 
to show that the victim had given prior consistent statements regarding the alleged 
offense. Id. 
In this case, the testimony of Ranae Allred and Officer Sorensen was admitted, not 
to show that Allred's statements were consistent, but to prove the truth of the matter 
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asserted. The trial court gave no instruction to the jury that these statements were offered 
only for rehabilitative purposes, as the trial court did in Speer. 
The State further claims that Officer Sorensen's statements were "offered merely 
to explain why and how he conducted an interview with a defendant" (Br. of App. at 15). 
However, the record clearly shows that Officer Sorensen was not asked in the context of 
explaining "why the officer took the investigative steps that he did." (Br. of App. at 15, 
quoting State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 547 (Utah App. 1998)). The prosecutor simply 
asked Officer Sorensen "where was the incident reported to you of as having taking 
place" in order to bolster Allred's testimony (R. 164 at 117). If the question was asked in 
a manner to allow Officer Sorensen to explain why he took the steps he did, the 
prosecutor would have asked the officer questions such as, "why he did not take the 
victim to the hospital the night of the crime; why detectives later called for the cashbox to 
be fingerprinted; and why the victim's clothes were in their present state;" or rather "what 
led you to believe Nelson was involved?" See Bryant, 965 P.2d at 547. Instead of asking 
a question that would show why Officer Sorensen took the necessary investigative steps 
that he did, the prosecutor waited essentially until the very last question on direct 
examination and only asked where the incident reportedly took place (R. 164 at 117). 
Thus, the record is clear that this question was asked, not to show investigative steps, but 
for the truth of the matter asserted. 
C. Elicitation of Otherwise Inadmissible Prior Bad Acts Was Ineffective 
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The State further claims that introduction of evidence regarding Nelson's prior 
theft conviction, prior drug conviction, and prior DUI conviction was "either inadvertent, 
based on a reasonable trial strategy or harmless" (Br. of App. at 16). Nelson asserts that 
there could be no reasonable trial strategy to introduce this prior bad acts evidence, 
especially considering that the Utah Rules of Evidence are specifically designed to limit 
prior bad acts evidence, since "[t]he admission of evidence of prior crimes may have such 
a powerful tendency to mislead the finder of fact as to subvert the constitutional principle 
that a defendant may be convicted only if guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a specific 
crime charged." State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, \ 15, 992 P.2d 551. 
The State claims that Nelson "simply volunteered more than he was asked" 
regarding the theft conviction (Br. of App. at 19). A close look at the record reveals 
otherwise. Trial counsel asked Nelson why he initially went to meet with Officer 
Sorensen (R. 164 at 144-45). Nelson could have lied and made up a story in order to 
avoid letting the jury know that he was meeting with Officer Nelson to discuss another 
charge, but instead Nelson told the truth (R. 164 at 145). It is clear that Nelson's trial 
counsel either did not know why Nelson initially met with Officer Sorensen or he was 
careless and forced Nelson to admit that he was meeting with Officer Sorensen to discuss 
a different charge. 
Regarding the drug conviction, the State claims that introducing this to the jury 
was reasonable trial strategy "[r]ather than waiting for this evidence to come in on cross-
examination" (Br of App. at 24). Nelson asserts that the State is aware that this evidence 
would have been inadmissible but for trial counsel's deficient performance in eliciting 
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this information. Moreover, it is absurd to assume that trial counsel's attempt to paint 
Nelson as a normal person with problems just like everyone else would include divulging 
to the jury the fact that he had drug and alcohol as well as theft convictions. There is 
simply no justification for introducing such facts to the jury and trial counsel's 
performance could be nothing but deficient. 
Additionally, this evidence certainly harmed Nelson because it called the jurors' 
attention to matters not proper for their consideration, namely that he had a criminal 
history of theft, drugs, and alcohol; otherwise a person of low moral character. 
There was no reason for the jury to hear and consider this evidence and Nelson's 
trial counsel clearly performed below an objective reasonable standard by opening the 
door to and introducing this evidence. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY EXCLUDING 
TWO ALIBI WITNESSES AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY 
ALLOWING HEARSAY TESTIMONY 
The State finally claims that the trial court's evidentiary rulings "were correct and 
not an abuse of discretion." (Br. of App. at 26). For the reasons stated in this brief and 
the original brief, Nelson asserts that the record clearly indicates that the trial court 
abused its discretion by excluding two alibi witnesses that were ready and willing to 
testify and that the trial court erred by allowing hearsay testimony that impermissibly 
bolstered the alleged victim's testimony. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in the original brief, Nelson asks 
this Court to reverse his conviction of forcible sodomy. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of April, 2004. 
Michael D: Esplin 
Margaret Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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